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Abstract
This paper focuses on ePassport security which utilizes RFID chip technology. ePassports 
are increasingly being used by governments to enhance the border entry and exit process. 
The paper briefly describes the nature of RFID technology and its characteristics pertaining 
to different aspects of security. The approach taken in this study is two-fold: experimental 
in the first instance, followed by a proof of concept (POC). The experimental study uses 
metrics to draw conclusions pertaining to the security, safety and privacy viability of the 
ePassport. Conclusions drawn from the experimental work are used to inform a proof of 
concept (POC) which provides one possible solution to eradicate the current issues related 
to the existing ePassport implementation. The proposed ePassport system is then compared 
to the existing ePassport using the defined metrics to determine which system provides 
the end user with the most privacy and security. The basic premise for this study is that if 
new technology is instituted to increase state security, then it should not be plagued with 
problems which would only increase national security concerns.
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1 Introduction
 A radio frequency identification (RFID) tag is a “tiny, inexpensive chip that 
transmits a uniquely identifying number over a short distance to a reading device, 
and thereby permits rapid, automated tracking of objects” (Jules, 2005a p. 1). 
Fundamentally it is a device which responds to queries from readers with a unique 
identification (UID) number.  This paper deals exclusively with passive tags which 
do not have their own power source and gain their power from reader interrogations. 
As the medium for interaction is radio waves, the tag must be relatively close to 
the reader because the intensity of the radio waves (and all other electromagnetic 
waves) obeys the inverse square law. This law states that as the distance increases, the 
intensity (I) decreases inversely by the square of the distance (d) (Centre, unknown). 
I.e. 
 Once a message has been transported from the reader to the tag via 
electromagnetic waves the tag will power itself through inductive conductance and 
reply with its UID and optional information such as a Universal Product Code or 
some predefined value. The reader will now capture this information and transmit 
it to a back-end system. When this information is received it will be processed and 
possibly shaped into structured queries (commands that search, alter etc a database) 
that may be used to update databases (Wamba, 2006).
 RFID is a wireless technology and hence interactions are not necessarily 
observed meaning that there is the potential for transactions to occur in stealth. 
With attributes like this, security conerns regarding tracking and much more are 
coming into question (Want, 2004).
2 The cornerstones of security
 Before this paper can proceed an understanding of what is implied by security 
must be defined. Security is the provision of confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
(Bishop, 2002).
•	 	Confidentiality is the ability to keep a secret a secret, it is the provision to ensure 
your private effects remain under your control. Access control mechanisms help 
provide a user with confidentiality, such access control mechanisms are passwords, 
tokens, biometrics, cryptography etc.
•	 	Integrity is the assurance that data is correct and not malformed, i.e. it represents 
wholly and truthfully the information it was intended to or originally documented 
to. Two techniques exist to provide integrity which are prevention (which ensure 
only authorized people edit data) and detection (the act of determining when 
data has been altered such as a chesksum).
•	 	Availability is the assurance that the data is accessible by authorized parties at all 
times. 
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Cryptographic operations, data hashing and pseudo random number generation 
are normally used to provide this security. A typical example of data hashing is the 
MD5 scheme which “takes as input a message of arbitrary length and produces as 
output a 128-bit “fingerprint” or “message digest” of the input” (Abzug, 1991). In 
the RFID context it is however currently impossible (Brainard, 2004) for a passive 
tag to carry out these calculations as they do not have their own power source and 
gain their power from reader interrogations. As this is the case other techniques 
such as embedded checksums must be applied to these RFID tags to ensure their 
security.
3 RFID security approaches
Molnar et al (2005) take into consideration that the challenge is to provide 
privacy protection without raising tag production and running costs. With this in 
mind they developed the theory of privacy for RFID through trusted computing. 
This proof of concept explains that tags will be developed to be used with dedicated 
readers that contain a trusted platform module (TPM) which is also known as a 
trustworthy reader. This ensures that a tag’s privacy is respected and hence data that 
is not meant to be read by the reader is not read. The threat model they define is 
that the reader can be compromised, but the TPM cannot as it is a tamper-resistant 
hardware module. The reader is split into 3 distinct portions, the:
•	 Reader	Core	–	is	the	radio	interface,	basically	an	RFID	reader	as	we	know	them	
today
•	 Policy	 Engine	 –	 software	 that	 controls	 reading	 to	 ensure	 it	 is	 preserving	
privacy 
•	 Consumer	Agent	–	enables	users	and	organizations	to	interrogate	the	reader	to	
ensure it is conforming to privacy standards (a monitoring tool).
 When scanning of a tag is to occur, the policy engine receives a request for read 
secrets, this is then passed to the TPM which determines if the reader core is valid. 
If all checks are passed the data is given to the trusted root and the policy engine is 
executed (Molnar, 2005). Yet the authors seem to cast doubt over their own proof 
of concept. While they state that “these ideas could be implemented today,” they 
go on to admit that “significant engineering challenges remain” before the product 
can be shipped” (Molnar, 2005, p. 3). Seeing as this implementation of a TPM is 
yet to be built and tested and a growing distain for trusted computing is evolving, 
it can be assumed that this technology is under scrutiny by community groups. 
Schoen (n.d.) is of the belief that trusted computing is not the answer as it delivers 
users new risks of anti-competitive and anti-consumer behaviour. Another risk is 
that manufacturers of trusted computing hardware may produce their products with 
‘defects’ (Schoen, n.d.).  
 Another interesting security implementation for RFID tags that again places 
the trust in the hands of the reader is the technical proposal of Jules (2005) which 
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describes ‘the privacy bit’. In this technical proposal a bit called the privacy bit is added 
to the tags memory which tells readers if the tag is in private or public mode. The 
theory relies solely on the readers being trustworthy and that restrictions are placed 
on the firmware or software to ensure the readers respect tag privacy (Jules, 2005a). 
As stated, this theory places the reliance of trust on the reader, what if rogue readers 
were used such as those described by Newitz (2006)? Researchers such as Westhues 
(2003) can devise their own readers, and it can be assumed that unscrupulous people 
creating their own readers will not ensure that their devices are respectful of tag 
privacy. Jules (2005) admits that the technology has not yet been released and also 
admits that standards bodies have not accepted the idea, however Jules is relying on 
developers to realize the problems of consumer privacy and maybe then his solution 
may have a chance (Jules, 2005a).
 The kill command is another technical approach which finally puts the onus 
on the tag to be trustworthy. The tag has a built-in command such that when the 
tag is authenticated to a reader, the reader can send the kill command to the tag 
and the tag will self destruct rendering itself unusable. The issue however is that no 
confirmation is given to whether the command was successful or if the command 
even reached the reader. Karjoth et al. (2005) have presented a revised version where 
visual confirmation can be observed as the kill command is a manual process of 
removing a pull tab which is part of the antenna. When this tab is removed the tag 
can no longer send or receive messages, nor power itself and hence is rendered useless 
(Karjoth, 2005). While this option is attractive and appears to be the most viable and 
most secure, it does not suit many environments as the user may wish for the tag 
to operate for their own purposes. This kill command is however currently enabled 
on RFID tags in circulation and is the first of the listed security technologies to be 
used by consumers and businesses.
 Finally blocker tags present a new perspective, instead of relying on encryption 
and trust, deception is used. This system allows a tag to generate a set of 2k UID’s 
which floods the reader with responses and leave it up to the reader to determine 
which UID is the real one (Brainard, 2004). Whilst this approach is very promising 
and has been shown to work in field studies and does not require changes to current 
RFID systems, it can be categorised as malicious because the flooding process can 
be described as a Denial-of-Service (DOS) attack (Jules, 2005a).
4 Established RFID security issues
 As shown in section 3 there are avenues that can be followed to secure RFID 
systems, however, each approach has its own respective limitations. This downside 
means that the RFID security technique is flawed, as RFID systems cannot provide 
any guarantees on confidentiality, integrity and availability as is explained below:
•	 Access	is	not	always	authenticated.	Westhues’s	(2003)	device	enables	him	to	read	
RFID tags in passing and gather the data off the tag.
The Second Workshop on the Social Implications of National Security
Page 261
•	 Integrity	cannot	always	be	preserved.	Integrity	 is	provided	via	detection	and	
prevention. From the security approaches in section 3, it is obvious that none 
implement either of these,
•	 Availability	can	be	compromised.	As	detailed	by	Jules	(2005a)	denial-of-service	
attacks can cause the reader to reset.
The major threats posed by RFID systems in humancentric applications are 
tracking (the act of following a tags movements based upon its UID response to 
interrogations) and inventorying (allowing a user to identify object(s) being carried by 
another person) (Jules, 2006). Whilst this threat seems to contradict the reason RFID 
tags exist (to track and find objects), in humancentric applications the user needs to 
have the ability to be anonymous. Inevitably these shortcomings result in personal 
security threats as people can be followed based upon the UID numbers emitted 
by their personal effects. More seriously alarming though, personal information can 
be edited and read by anyone with the technology and the know-how (Westhues, 
2003).
5 RFID in ePassports and possible security attacks
 An ePassport is just like an existing passport however it has an RFID tag inserted 
in it which essentially holds the same information that is stored on the biographical 
page of the passport.
The same information as a passport’s data page- passport holder’s name, 
nationality, gender, date of birth, and a digitized photo. It will also store 
the passport number, issue date, expiration date, and type of passport 
(Department, 2005). 
The RFID chip is simply a second data source which is used to verify the 
printed data on the passport and hence identify the bona-fide holder with increased 
confidence. The rationale behind the ePassport is to provide better protection against 
misuse and tampering, reduce identify fraud, enhance border protection and provide 
fast and efficient passport checks (Trade, n.d.). Civil libertarian groups especially 
however question the motivation for the rapid implementation of the ePassport.
 To use an ePassport, a user opens their passport to the biographical page and 
presents it to the identification machine. This machine will read the specially prepared 
area called the machine readable zone (MRZ) which provides the identification 
machine with the ‘key’ to decrypt the public key (PKI) ciphertext which safeguards 
the data. Once this step is complete, a check occurs to ensure the data on the 
RFID matches the data on the passport’s biographical page (Trade, n.d.; Launch 
of ePassport, 2005). The US state department has taken an experimental approach 
to proving the security of their ePassports (which follow the same ICACO design 
standards as Australia’s), however how secure this system is has been kept a secret. 
Extensive testing has occurred however the department is not releasing their findings 
(Gonsalves, 2005).
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 The most deep-rooted problem with RFID passports is not to do with the 
technology itself, but the policies which govern the technology in the passport 
domain. Coffee (2006) explains that “[a] passport with a failed e-chip remains 
a valid travel document”. The reason this must be emphasised is because RSA 
laboratories report that an RFID chip can be deactivated with nothing more than a 
microwave (Labratories, n.d.). Furthermore RFID’s utilize the radio wave medium 
to communicate, hence any transmission can be observed by a rogue reader within 
the right range. Eavesdropping is a major security issue for RFID not just because 
it is hard to stop, but harder still to detect (Juels, 2005b). Whilst the government 
has employed Faraday cages into its ePassport design, it is not inconceivable that 
an ePassport could become even a fraction open when being carried in a bag or 
purse hence allowing it to become compromised (Lamb, 2006). On the successful 
capturing of a signal through eavesdropping, the perpetrator is given the options 
of:
1. using the signal in a replay attack: send the same signal again at a convenient 
time such as when posing as the victim (Answers.com, n.d.) or;
2. an offline attack: where the signal is taken and interrogated to possibly break 
the encryption etc (Chuvakin, 2004).
 Moses (2006) has also documented claims by Laurie, which reveal that it is 
possible to skim peoples’ information from their ePassport. This is contradictory to 
the statements made by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade spokeswoman 
that one canoe “compromise the security of Australia’s ePassport.”. The department 
states that there is no way to read the RFID tag without first obtaining the key which 
is printed in the machine readable zone on the biographical page of the passport. 
However this information is simply a mixture of the date of birth, expiry date of 
the passport and the passport number which Laurie explains can be determined 
through sources such as online airline bookings (Moses, 2006). Due to this evidence 
it is clear that another method must be constructed which allows this technology 
to provide privacy and security for its users.
 A reader can be set to continuously scan for ePassports, when one of interest is 
found the user can follow the RF waves much like following an electronic beacon. 
Critics such as Munro (2007) believe that the new ePassport systems could be 
used to track a user quite simply if readers are placed in the right position. When 
considering Gonsalaves (2005) claims that the RFID tags in passports can actually 
be read from up to 30 feet, it is no wonder that conspiracy theories surrounding 
the potential for governments to track passport holders are on the increase. These 
notions are highlighted by the likes of Lamb (2006) who state that “[t]here’s clearly 
something else that they [the government] have in mind here, and we believe that 
they want the ability to track people without their knowledge.” These claims are 
continuously given more force when it is considered that the US government 
continued with the deployment of ePassports even after receiving 98% negative 
feedback from the public regarding the proposal (Lamb, 2006). Whilst these claims 
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are not supported by current technical evidence, they do carry some weight. 
 Finally, the ePassport places all of the user’s personal information along with a 
digital photo onto an RFID chip. It is all there for the taking, in one basket and plans 
are in progress to use the same basket for even more. The ePassport was designed 
conforming to guidelines provided by the (International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO), one of the design aims for the ePassport is to “[provide] a path to the use 
of ePassports to facilitate biometric or e-commerce applications” (Kaliski, 2005). 
This increases the exposure of the ePassport and increases the risk of skimming 
and tracking. All in all it is just giving unscrupulous people more opportunities to 
steal your identity. All the user’s information is in a single location (the RFID chip) 
for the taking. If someone does break into the chip they will have all the centrally 
stored personal information and the owner would not even know it. Whilst this theft 
of information could occur in a more clandestine fashion, simply by stealing the 
passport and copying the information from the biographical page, the difference is 
that someone may notice their passport physically missing, however they would never 
know if someone remotely had broken into their chip and stolen their data.
6 Assessment of RFID’s in ePassports
Before a new, more secure implementation of an ePassport is possible, it is a 
necessity to first asses the current technology being utilised. The rationale behind 
these experiments is to create metrics by which to measure and assess security 
in RFID which can then be reflected in an ePassport system. Not only are these 
experiments paramount in assessing the current implementation of RFID tags in 
ePassports, they are also central in creating a revised implementation of the ePassport 
which will eliminate predecessor faults. The completion of each forthcoming 
experiment will culminate in a value which will be either ‘breached’ or ‘resisted 
breach’ as defined by the unit of measurement.
6.1 The Experiments
The following experiments were carried out with either Standard Apparatus 1 
or Standard Apparatus 2.
6.1.1 Standard Apparatus 1
The apparatus used was a Motorola/Symbol XR400 RFID reader connected to 
2 antennas configured in a non portal configuration. This system had an adjustable 
reading range of approximately 3 meters to 1 centimetre. The antennas were facing 
opposite directions and separated by a distance of 2 meters. The apparatus was 
configured to scan continuously for Class 0 and Gen2 tags. Whilst this system had an 
excellent read range, and was highly configurable with regards to scan frequencies, 
distances and types, it did not have the capabilities to read the actual data stored 
on the tag.
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6.1.2 Standard Apparatus 2
The apparatus used was a BlackBay handheld RF scanner which was configured 
to scan for ISO, Milfare, I-code and other protocols. This scanner had an extremely 
limited range of less than 5 centimeters and hence was limited in its usefulness, 
however it did allow for the data in tags to be read and stored.
6.2 Experiment 1- Injection attack on RFID
Aim: To determine the possibility of malforming database queries to cause 
detrimental database functions.
Hypothesis: Injection attacks are malformed database queries which trick the 
database into doing something otherwise illegal. This could be actions such as 
editing a certain entry or dropping an entire table. This form of attack has occurred 
time and time again over the internet in which interactive forms retrieve user 
data (which may be malformed) and edit a central database according to the data 
retrieved (Buehrer, 2005; Orso, 2005). It is to be assumed then that injection attacks 
are possible for RFID systems as the only object changing in the two instances is 
the medium upon which information is delivered to the back-end system (http to 
wireless communications).  
Method: The ‘Standard Apparatus 2’ was used to read a set of 3 RFID tags. The 
tags ID and data were as follows:
ID Data
1111111111AAAAAAAAAAA1439 Item1
1111111111AAAAAAAAAAA1438 Item2;Drop Table Data_table;
1111111111AAAAAAAAAAA1440 Item3
An SQL server is constructed with a table named ‘Data_table’ consisting of a 
single column called data. This SQL server then interfaces with a simple program 
which extracts the data held in the ‘docked’ scanner and constructs SQL queries 
which insert the scanned data into the database such as “INSERT INTO  Data_table 
VALUES(“EXTRACTED DATA FROM SCANNER”);”.
Results: After the program updates the database with the first data element in 




After the second data element is processed, the database reflects: ‘ERROR, NO 
SUCH TABLE’
After the third and final data element is processed, the database reflects: ‘ERROR, 
NO SUCH TABLE’.
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Security breach: Breached.
Conclusion: It has been shown that the malformed tag data deleted all items and 
the entire database. After the second tag was added an error was reported stating 
that the table specified ‘Data_table’ did not exist. This hence proves the hypothesis 
correct and it can be stated that an Injection attack can occur on a database system 
if the strings used to create the structured query are not parsed correctly.
6.3 Experiment 2- Blocking a reader
6.3.1 Part A - Faraday cage
Aim: To create a more secure Faraday cage in which to encase the ePassport to 
address the current Faraday cage faults found by Flexills (2006).
Hypothesis: Currently a Faraday cage exists in the cover of the ePassport but as 
Flexills (2006) pointed out, if the ePassport is thrown into a bag or purse and opens 
only slightly, it is possible to read the passport. To overcome this, a purse like design 
which is lined with a foil will alleviate the issues and prevent reads from occurring 
unless the passport is removed from the purse.
 





















Figure 1- A Faraday Cage
Method: The Standard Apparatus 1 is used to firstly read a tag to create a control. 
Alfoil was then used to fashion the below pouch allowing enough space in the 
pouch to snugly fit the RFID tag. 
Once complete the tag is placed into the pouch as shown and the flap locked 
into place. The Standard Apparatus 1 is then set to continuously scan for the tag. 
The flap is then opened and the scanning is allowed to continue. Finally remove 
the RFID tag completely from the pouch and ensure the tag can still be read.
Results: The control tag returns its tag ID when it is not encased in the pouch 
but when placed inside the pouch with the flap shut the tag ceases to respond 
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at all. Even when the flap is opened, the tag still does not respond. When the tag 
is completely removed from the pouch the tag can be read and replies with the 
correct tag ID.
Security Breach: Not applicable.
Conclusions: The new pouch enclosure design is by far a more secure method 
to house an ePassport. The experiment proves that the tag cannot be read when it is 
housed in the pouch, even if the flap is not secured. The current ePassport Faraday 
enclosure is susceptible to reads when the ePassport is partially open hence suggesting 
that the proposed enclosure will provide a higher degree of security.
6.3.2 Part B - External wave injection
Aim: To disrupt the reading of a tag for a short amount of time enabling a tag 
to pass by a reader unnoticed. 
Hypothesis: An RFID tag uses radio waves as its transmission media, hence 
some device producing radio waves may disturb the transmission from the tag to the 
reader or visa versa (Australia, 2007). This phenomenon will prevent the tag from 
being read by a reader by either invoking destructive interference which degrades 
the message such that sense cannot be made from it, or abolishes the message all 
together. This occurrence will therefore enable the RFID tag to pass by the reader 
unnoticed. 
Method: Apparatus 1 is set up along with a Sony Ericsson S700i (GSM with 
900MHZ radio transmission). The Sony Ericsson is placed 5 cm behind a tag 
(class 0). The reader is then set to continuously scan the tag, which is hence read 
continuously. The phone is then set to initiate a phone call (emit a large amount 
of wave interference). The read rate is then assessed and then compared to the rate 
recorded when the phone call is terminated.
Results:
Condition Read rate
Before phone is introduced to system Approximately 1 read per second
Phone introduced, call not initiated Approximately 1 read per second
Call initiated 0 reads per second
Security breach: Breached.
Conclusion: A large amount of wave injection into an RFID system can disrupt 
reader interrogations causing tags to pass by unnoticed. This application could be 
used to allow a user to pass by in stealth or even temporarily disable the chip in the 
ePassport, reverting it to a basic passport.
6.4 Experiment 3- Skimming an RFID tag
Aim: To determine the possibility of tracking a user and skimming information 
off their RFID enabled objects in a small scale example.
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Hypothesis: Well-placed readers will provide enough information to allow 
inference to take place to a high degree of confidence. These readers will not only 
enable the tracking of a user, but also provide information about the RFID enabled 
items being carried. This occurrence is highly intrusive and provides the system 
owners the ability to profile and keep tabs on the user’s tag.   
Method: The Standard Apparatus 1 is used but the antenna configuration is 
modified to better model a real life implementation. Firstly 2 more antennas are 
added to the reader and all readers read ranges are reduced to 35% (this approximately 
reduces the read distance to 1.05 meters). The antennas are now spaced out around 
a room such that the antennas read zones do not cross over and allow dead zones 
(areas where no reader is monitoring the space) to occur to represent larger distances 
between read points. The antennas themselves represent buildings or public places. 
At selected antennas, tags are positioned to represent items that a user may wish 
to take. A user is now given a tag with a recorded tag ID and encouraged to move 
around the room at their own discretion and pick up any tags (items) as they please. 
As the user now moves around the room with their unique tag ID they are tracked 
via the antennas, each time a user enters an antennas zone, a log is formed with a 
time stamp. This log reflects the time the tag ID was interrogated and the tag ID 
itself. As the user picks up tags (items) and makes the transition to another zone, it 
will be evident that they are carrying the tag as it will show up in a new zone with 
their unique tag ID.
Results: Table 1 below represents the recorded events. The antennas were named 
North, East, South and West for obvious reasons.
The table shows a user (1111111111AAAAAAAAAAA1437) started at the 
Northern area. Two items were also positioned at the South and East areas. The 
user progresses to the Eastern area and continues to slowly move into the southern 
areas. Here they pick up an item (1111111111AAAAAAAAAAA1436) and continue 
moving with this item into the Eastern area. 
Security breach: Breached.
Conclusion: It is possible to track a user, skim for information regarding what 
they are carrying and hence profile the user. The occurrence of this security breach 
allows the RFID infrastructure owners to become ever more pervasive in the user’s 
life. It allows the surveiller to know when a user carries out an act, when they 
purchase something, when they are at a certain location and so much more. This 
breach allows for the formation of a ‘Ralker’ (RFID Stalker) which under other 
mediums is outlawed and only lawfully granted to governments under certain 
circumstances.
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Table 1- Experiment 3 results


























6.5 Experiment 4- Killing an RFID tag
Aim: To destroy an RFID tag such that it will no longer respond to reader 
interrogations.
Hypothesis: An RFID tag contains a small circuit board, like all circuit boards 
too much voltage or current will cause the board to overheat. As an RFID tag gathers 
its electricity from electro magnetic frequency (EMF) radiation, it is assumed that 
a large burst of EMF radiation will cause the circuit board to overheat.
Method: An RFID tag is firstly scanned to ensure that it is in working order. The 
tag is then placed into a microwave and set on high for 10 seconds. The tag is then 
removed from the microwave and scanned to determine if the tag is still usable.
Results: The RFID tag read correctly before entering the microwave, however 
after 10 seconds in the microwave the RFID tag failed to respond to reader 
interrogations. Whilst in the microwave a bright glow was recorded coming out of 
the RFID tag, this was assumed to be the circuit board of the RFID tag frying.
Security breach: Breached.
Conclusion: The microwave appliance emits short 2.5 GHz waves called 
microwaves when it is turned on. These high frequency waves caused an increased 
voltage to flow inside the induction coil into the circuit board. This hence proved 
that if a large burst of EMF waves comes into contact with an RFID tag it can be 
destroyed.
6.6 Experiment 5- Flooding a reader
Aim: To flood a reader with so many requests, the reader either shuts down or 
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allows tags to pass by its reading range unnoticed.
Hypothesis: It is possible to flood a reader, but not overly practical as the amount 
of tags required will not be easily concealable or manageable.
Method: Countless class 0 tags are placed within a single antenna’s read range. 
One tag with a known ID is kept out of the read range to test if it can pass by 
unnoticed. The reader is then turned on and the known tag is moved into the read 
range and then removed from the read range. The known ID is then searched for 
to determine if it has moved into the system unnoticed.
Results: A flood could not be created within the laboratory as not enough tags 
were available to cause the reader to read incorrectly. This was shown by the tag 
appearing each time it was introduced into the system and then removed.
Security breach: Resisted breach.
Conclusion: A flood attack on a reader is theoretically possible, however may 
not practically be possible if a read range was reduced to 10 cm. There would not be 
enough room to position enough tags to cause the flood to occur (for a summary 
of results from each experiment, see table 2 below).
Table 2- Summary of experiments and meta-
analysis and their effects on ePassports
Security Breach Does it impede on the privacy and security meant to be 
provided by the ePassport?
Skimming A user could be followed and profiled, a smart bomb could 
be created if commonalities in data were found.




The failing Faraday cage in the current ePassport allows for 
rogue reading in stealth.
Killing a tag A tag can be killed and hence reduce an ePassport back into 
a paper-based passport. Hence no added security.
Copying a tag 
and mimicking 
An ePassport could be copied and the encryption taken 
home to be used in an offline attack to decrypt the data.
6.7 Compare experimental results with the work of Wethues
 The work of Wethues (2003) has to be assessed in a meta analysis as the technical 
requirements needed to build his device are beyond the scope of this study. To provide 
credibility to Westhues’s findings as this study could not test his creation, Newitz’s 
(2006) article is cited as it describes the device in question. Wethues (2003) has 
developed a device which is capable of reading an RFID tag, copying the unique 
ID emitted by that device and then replaying the captured ID to a reader. Simply 
put, Westhues has created a ‘replay attack’ over the RFID medium. The device has 
a small read range and requires the user to almost brush past the tag they wish to 
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copy, however if the device is set up near a read point, the read distance is magnified 
enormously as the card is being ‘excited’ by another reader. This phenomenon allows 
the device to read tags from behind a wall or over a distance (Westhues, 2003). 
 To provide the much needed credibility to these claims, Newitz (2006) describes 
an encounter she has with Westhues. The author describes watching Westhues walk 
past an Internet security company, CEO James Van Bokkelen with a concealed 
antenna in the palm of his hand. Wethues returns to Newitz and plugs his device (via 
USB) into this laptop to determine if a signal was correctly recorded. Convinced 
that a successful read occurred, Westhues proceeds into the office building and sets 
his device to ‘mimic’ mode and waves his antenna in front of the proximity reader. 
Newitz (2006) concluded this device to be a complete success because the door 
in front of them unlocked and opened. This occurrence reinforces that RFID tags 
are not secure and can be copied at will. Furthermore, if this device was brought 
into the ePassport domain, the device owner could walk through an international 
airport stealing people’s passport details in stealth. They could then return home 
and begin cracking the encryption hiding the data sets. With this information they 
can begin to commit fraud and identity theft.
 It has been shown that the current implementation of the ePassport was not 
well-thought out and allows for unscrupulous people to steal personal information 
and misuse this information. Through the meta analysis it has been shown that it is 
possible to steal information using an RFID device and record the data. This data 
could then be used in an offline attack as described by Sterling (2006) and Lettice 
(2007). The added security that the ePassport is intended to provide is shown to 
be non substantial but also shown to reduce the data security of its users. With this 
knowledge it is assumable that another implementation must be sort after such that 
the intended benefits can actually be achieved.
7 Proof of Concept
This paper has identified a number of shortcomings with the current ePassport 
technology. The proof of concept below is aimed at developing an ePassport which 
is more secure than the existing one by:
•	 Removing	the	ability	to	skim	and	track	the	ePassport	by	implementing	a	user	
verification system for the tag.
•	 Removing	the	flimsy	encryption	system	and	replacing	 it	with	a	multi-tiered	
security system without a single point of failure.
•	 Providing	 a	 better	 implementation	 of	 the	 Faraday	 cage	 to	 deter	 rogue	
scanning.
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Figure 2- Message Flow Diagram
 
Step User Tag Machine Databases Border Security 
1 User presents passport 
open at machine readable 
section to machine 
    
2   Sends search query      
consisting of the 
retrieved ID information 
  
3    Responds with Users 
fingerprint and pointer 
to their information 
 
4   Machine requests 
fingerprint from user 
  
5 User supplies fingerprint 
to fingerprint reader 
    
6   Matches fingerprint with 
fingerprint on file. If match 
sends pointer to database 
  
7    Database replies with 
User information and tag 
password 
 
8    
Sends retrieved 
password  to tag   
  
9   
Replies with hashed user 
information 
   




11 Border security may opt to speak with the user (owner of the passport) or  
simply rely upon the machines decision. 
5 .1.1 Data flow diagr am 
7.1 Steps Explained
Step 1: The user opens their passport to the machine readable zone and places 
it on the read point of the machine. The machine will then scan the passport to 
retrieve the data from the MRZ.  
Step 2: The data that has been obtained from the passport is now used to 
construct a database query. This data is simply date of birth, first name, last name etc 
(information that is already contained on the passport). The query is then issued to 
a database and a return is expected. This is the first layer of security, as a query that 
retrieves no records means that the identity this person is attempting to masquerade 
does not exist.
Step 3: If a match is found in the database, the users ‘fileprint’ (Khanna, 2004) 
and a pointer to the user’s information in the second database is returned.  
Step 4: The machine requests that the user place their fingerprint over the 
fingerprint reader so that a ‘searchprint’ (Khanna, 2004) can be obtained.
Step 5: User supplies their own fingerprint (‘searchprint’) as the machine 
requested.
Step 6: The ‘searchprint’ and ‘fileprint’ are now compared, if a positive match is 
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found then the pointer to the next database will then and only then be followed. If 
the pointer is to be followed, the database will be queried with the pointer to directly 
access the information required. This is the second step of security which proves 
that the identity claimed belongs to that physical person through biometrics.
Step 7: The database replies with the user’s information (which is everything 
that would be printed on the passport such as date of birth, names, etc.) along with 
a tag password. This tag password exists in a 1–to-1 relationship by which only one 
password exists for each unique tag.
Step 8: The retrieved password is issued to the tag. The tag will only respond 
with its information when it receives the correct password. This system provides 
a third step in security to ensure that the RFID chip within the passport is the 
correct chip for this identity, if the correct password was not encountered the chip 
would not respond. As a further security precaution, incorrect passwords could be 
sent at random to the tag to ensure the tag is not compromised and programmed to 
respond to anything. This password system is adapted from the kill-tag system which 
when the correct password is received the tag calls its kill function and disables 
itself. However this adaptation replaces the kill function with a reply function and 
removes the standard reply function entirely as this proposed system never intends 
for the tag to reply under any other circumstances.
Step 9: If the correct password was encountered, the response is a hash string 
which is an ordered concatenation of the user’s information and password which 
is then put through the MD5 hashing scheme.  
Step 10: The machine will now hash the database retrieved user information and 
compare the hash output to that obtained from the passport. This is the fourth step 
in security which ensures that the information on the tag does actually represent 
the bona-fide user. The reason the tag stores a hashed version rather than plain text 
version is to ensure that skimming of tags can reap no reward. An authentication 
decision (passed or denied) is determined by this comparison.
Step 11: This authentication decision can then either be sent to a border security 
office manning the checkpoint at which point the officer may wish to conduct a 
visual check also. Conversely, this system can be used on an unmanned checkpoint 
and the decision will either allow the traveller to continue their journey, or prevent 
them from continuing any further.
7.2 Questioning the “key” to the ePassport system
 Currently ePassports use 3DES encryption for the data on the RFID tags. 
Whilst this is an industry standard technology, the issue lies in the allocation of 
the key to decrypt the data. When designing the current ePassport, ICAO decided 
that the key to decrypt the data was to be composed using a concatenation of the 
passport number, holders date of birth, and passport expiry date (in that particular 
order). If an unscrupulous user was able to copy the passport data as detailed in the 
meta-analysis above, and could combine this with a high level phishing attack, the 
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key space could be reduced considerably as detailed by (Sterling, 2006). To alleviate 
this issue the proposed solution uses message digests. A message digest can never be 
reversed to show the original data hence nobody can ever steal your information 
from your passport in stealth. The issue with message digests is that because their 
never reversed to their original form, somebody could make an ePassport to just hold 
your message digest and nobody would be any the wiser. Whilst this is theoretically 
possible, it is not very practical. In order to succeed in this form of attack, the attacker 
would:
1. have to know the unique password for the ePassport he/she was trying to 
copy; and
2. have to have the same fingerprint as the legitimate user; and 
3. have to look exactly like the legitimate user.
7.3 Layers of security provided by the proposed system
There are 4 layers of security offered by the proposed system. 
Layer 1: The data that defines a unique user is used as a query in the passport 
holders database. If a match is not found it obviously shows that the passport does 
not exist and hence the owner is attempting to act fraudulently. If a match is found, it 
verifies that the user does actually exist and the document presented is legitimate. 
Layer 2: To ensure that the person claiming to own the details in the passport 
actually does, a biometric test is used. The user’s fingerprint (‘searchprint’) is taken 
and compared to the ‘fileprint’ which belongs to the passport. If a match occurs, it 
proves that the passport does belong to the bona-fide user.
Layer 3: Now that it has been established that the correct user is the holder 
of the right passport, it is necessary to ensure that the right chip is in the passport. 
This step prevents a person from cloning a passport and installing a fake RFID tag 
in it instead. A unique password which corresponds to the passport in question is 
sent to the tag. Upon receiving the correct password the chip will respond with 
data, however if an incorrect password is encountered, the tag will remain dormant 
and ignore all requests. To ensure someone has not altered the tag to respond at 
any time, a sequence of passwords can be sent to the tag, all incorrect but one. If 
the tag responds to an incorrect password, it can be assumed that the tag has been 
tampered with.
Layer 4: The tag in the passport only stores hashed user values which are created 
via a one way function and hence can never be reverted back to their original 
form. This security feature preserves user data as personal information can never 
be skimmed off the tag even if the right password is found. This means that smart 
bombs cannot be made to be denominational as the hash string will not reveal 
information regarding the country of origin etc.
7.4 Confidentiality
Preservation 1: The proposed system’s kill tag approach prevents a rogue reader 
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from tracking users as it is assumed that a rogue reader will not have the tags unique 
password. Assuming this, a rogue reader will never get any form of response from a 
tag. Hence the tag owner can travel at ease as their identity is never disclosed.
Preservation 2: In the event that a rogue reader does determine the tags unique 
password, the information retrieved is in actual fact useless. The tag only stores 
hashed information which according to the design and manifest behind hashing, 
can never be processed back into its original form. Hence if a breach occurs and a 
rogue reader does steal tag data, they have not stolen anything of worth.
7.5 Integrity
 The integrity of this system lies in the comparison processes of stored 
information to retrieved information. The system uses a multi-tiered authentication 
verification process, by which a user makes an authentication claim (i.e. delivers a 
passport to the machine) and must then verify that they actually own the passport 
(via a fingerprint scan). This is again demonstrated when the tag must prove that it 
belongs to the right passport which belongs to the bona-fide user by communicating 
with the machine, if, and only if the correct password is received. This phenomenon 
culminates in a final authentication and verification process by which the tag’s 
hash string is compared to the on file hash string. This multi-tiered process aims at 
ensuring that changes to data cannot occur, but ultimately if they do occur, one of 
the tiers of authentication and verification will determine the fraudulence.
7.6 Availability
 The user verification system for the tag is a simple means to provide the 
availability characteristic as this scheme requires a password to read the tag. It is 
assumed that only a bona-fide user will have the password and hence only makes 
the tag available to intended users.
7.7 Databases
 The user verification system for the tag is a simple means to provide the 
availability characteristic as this scheme requires a password to read the tag. It is 
assumed that only a bona-fide user will have the password and therefore the tag is 
made available to intended users alone.
 The reason the two databases (figure 3) are set up into an array is a performance 
consideration and is intended to reduce the search space and hence allow for practical 
searching. Using Australia as an example, the top 20 surnames are tabulated and the 
total frequency of each of the first letters is recorded in figure 4.
 The ‘W’ category holds 160,303 occurrences and when put into perspective 
accounts for 20.9% of the top 20 occurrences.  Applying this figure to the Australian 
population as a total (approximately 20 million) to provide a rough generalization, 
it is possible to see that the W database may hold approximately 4 million entries. 
Considering that ‘Google’ can search its indexes and return 2,370,000,000 entries 
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for the letter ‘e’ in 0.09 seconds it is hence assumed that the intended database model 
will function efficiently. Data was tabulated using Wikipedia (2007) who gathered 
their results from IP Australia, Government of Australia.
4. Re turns 
requested 
data  
3. The *PTR is a memory
address in the 2nd database




















2. Re turns 
data along 




Figure 3- Accessing records from the database
Figure 4- Letter-specific databases for faster searching on surname
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7.8  Policy
 Currently border security will accept an ePassport with a faulty RFID chip as 
a legitimate identification document (table 3). This policy is a critical mistake as it 
circumvents the reason the ePassport was created. If an unscrupulous person disables 
an RFID chip, the ePassport is now only as secure as a passport without an RFID 
chip. This is obviously a problem or else why would the government have wished 
to introduce an ePassport? To remedy this, the policy surrounding the proposed 
implementation of an ePassport will define a passport with a faulty RFID tag as 
an illegitimate identification document and will take note of the owner for further 
investigation.
Table 3- ePassport comparisons
Possible security 
breach
Current ePassport Proposed ePassport
Tracking Breach Resisted Breach
Killing Breach Resisted Breach
Injection attack Breach Breach
Blocking security device Breach Resisted Breach
Wave injection attack Breach Breach
Steal information Breach Resisted Breach





Tracking: The proposed ePassport can only be tracked if the right password is 
issued to the tag or else no response will be obtained, however the current ePassport 
will respond to anything.
Killing: Both implementations are susceptible to a tag being destroyed however 
the policy for the proposed implementation ensures that this occurrence does not 
lead to a breach.
Injection attack: Both systems are perceptible to an injection attack if their 
back-end systems are not configured correctly.
Blocking security device: The Faraday cage that houses the current ePassport 
fails if the passport is only slightly open (this may occur if thrown into a bag). 
The proposed enclosure stops the ePassport from opening, hence preventing an 
inadvertent read window.
Wave injection attack: Both systems are perceptible to this attack as it attacks 
the core technology.
Steal information: The current ePassport contains encrypted information 
which can be decrypted, the proposed implementation keeps one way message digests 
of the data which can never changed back into the information’s original form.
Flooding: Both the new and the proposed system would require so many tags 
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to actually produce a flooding attack that they could not all be concealed.
8 The irony of it all
 “[A]ny system is only as secure as its weakest point of entry” (Microsoft, 
n.d.).
 Whilst this quote was not originally used in the context of ePassports, it applies 
itself with the same meaning. By reviewing the process of obtaining a passport in 
Australia the weakest points are quickly identified which render all attempts to secure 
a passport useless. Figure 5 shows the relationship between these important personal 
documents. It also shows that the single point of failure is the birth certificate. Zill 
(n.d.) also takes this point of view and denotes a birth certificate is “a “weak” document 
because it is relatively easy to forge and has no photo or fingerprint requirement 
(Zill, n.d.). Following the schema presented, once a birth certificate is obtained, a 
Medicare card can also be obtained. A driver’s license is the next obvious progression 
as both a Medicare card and birth certificate are in possession. Finally, a passport can 
be obtained as all the vital government documents are in possession. The previous 
chronological investigation shows that a passport is not made secure by enhancing 
the technologies and policies surrounding it, as an illegitimate passport can easily 
be obtained using fake seminal documents. It is important however to realize that 
the basis of this paper is not to solve the existence of fraudulent passports, but to 
ensure that if this particular RFID technology ‘must’ be used, that the technology 
is applied in such a way that it does not cause new afflictions upon society.
Passport 
B i rth 























B i rth 
C erti f icate 
B i rth C erti f icate 
Parent bi rth 







D rivers L icense 
B i rth 




Figure 5- Important personal identification documents
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